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ARGUMENT 
I . THE ACT NEED NOT BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
A statute should not be declared unconstitutional, 
where there is an interpretation of the statute which 
would not violate constitutional prohibitions. In the 
present case, the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (the 
"Act") need not be declared unconstitutional, because a 
constitutionally permissible interpretation is available. 
Because the resolution of the present matter does not 
require this Court to declare the Act unconstitutional, 
Points II, III and IV, on pages 26 through 31, of the 
Brief of Appellees McKay-Dee Hospital Center and 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (the UIHC Brief") are 
largely irrelevant. Appellants have not requested a 
declaration that the Act is unconstitutional. Appellants 
simply request that the Act be correctly interpreted, 
which interpretation requires both (1) that the language 
of the Act be interpreted as written and in accord with 
the stated legislative intent, and (2) that the Act be 
interpreted so as not to violate well-established 
constitutional principles raised before the trial court. 
1 
Appellees' argument that this Court upheld the two-
year statute of limitations period for the commencement 
of actions under the Act in Allen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc. , 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981), is not determinative 
of how the Act should be interpreted so as to avoid 
making other provisions of the Act unconstitutional as 
applied.1 Similarly, the existence of a legitimate 
purpose for the two-year limitations period does is not 
dispositive of a legitimate purpose, or even an intent, 
on the part of the legislature to limit the ability of 
plaintiffs to bring claims against health care providers 
by provisions of the Act other than the by the 
limitations period. 
The statement of legislative purpose appearing in 
Utah Code Ann. , section 78-14-2 contains two parts. The 
1 The citations contained in the Brief of Appellees 
Ivan D. Wright, M.D.; Harold Vonk, M.D.; and Ronald S. 
Rankin, M.D. (the UM.D. Brief"), to articles in Forbes and 
Time magazines are neither authoritative nor do they aid 
in interpretation of the statute. The referenced cases, 
likewise, relate only to the legitimacy of the two-year 
statute of limitations and not to the other implementing 
provisions of the Act. 
2 
first part identifies the justification for the two-vear 
limitations period and states: 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the 
legislature to provide a reasonable time in which 
actions may be commenced against health care 
providers while limiting that time to a specific 
period for which professional liability insurance 
premiums can be reasonably and accurately 
calculated;... 
(emphasis added) . The second part identifies the 
justification for the procedural requirements of the Act, 
which are the subject matter of the present appeal, and 
states: 
• . . and to provide other procedural changes to 
expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims. 
(emphasis added) . Thus, matters of procedure have the 
legislative purpose solely of expediting "early 
evaluation and settlement," not to impede in whole or in 
part the bringing of claims. The implementing rules 
similarly provide in R156-78A-4(1), "Liberal 
Construction. These rules shall be liberally construed 
to secure the just, speedy and economical determination 
of all issues presented to the division." The 
legislature did not intend that the procedural 
3 
requirements of the Act function to limit the 
commencement of actions against health care providers. 
The legislative intent is further apparent from the 
provisions of those sections of the statute discussed 
under Argument II, below. Unfortunately, the trial court 
interpreted the procedural requirements of the Act as 
having a purpose of limiting the ability of plaintiffs to 
bring claims. Appellants' argument, both in its brief 
and before the trial court, pointed out that such an 
interpretation is unconstitutional, as well as contrary 
to the language of the statute. Because the contrary 
interpretation would be unconstitutional, the 
interpretation encouraged by the Appellants constitutes 
the preferred interpretation. 
II, SECTION 78-14-12(2)(b) DID NOT DEPRIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT OF JURISDICTION, 
The parties are in agreement that Section 78-14-
12(2) (b) states: "The request shall be mailed to all 
health care providers named in the notice and request." 
The issue on appeal is the effect of a failure to mail 
the Request, in the absence of a statutory provision 
4 
either identifying mailing of the Request as a 
prerequisite to filing a complaint or creating a 
limitation on the jurisdiction of the courts. 
The parties are also in agreement that the dismissal 
of the present action by the trial court was based solely 
on the undisputed fact that the Appellants did not mail a 
copy of the request for prelitigation panel review (the 
"Request") to the health care providers at the time it 
was filed with the Division. 
The primary issue on appeal is whether Appellants 
failure to mail a copy of the Request to the health care 
providers, notwithstanding that none of the health care 
providers were at the time yet served with the notice of 
intent to commence legal action (the "Notice")2 and 
thereby subject to the jurisdiction of the Division (much 
like an unserved defendant in litigation would not be 
served with pleadings between active litigants) , was a 
2 Since the health care providers were all served 
with the Notice, the suggestion on pages 19 of the IHC 
Brief that they were somehow deprived "warning" of the 
pending action is incorrect. As a practical matter, all 
of the defendants were aware of the proceedings. They did 
not need a second notice. 
5 
decision of the part of the Appellants which thereby 
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. 
The IHC Brief does not dispute that the question of 
jurisdiction raised by the service of the Request upon a 
defendant is a question of first impression before this 
Court, and has not been previously addressed in any case 
cited by either party.3 
The defendant health care providers do not dispute 
that they have not based their arguments that mailing of 
the Request is jurisdictional on Section 78-14-12(2) 
concerning the duties of the plaintiff, but have instead 
extrapolated their argument from the larger citation to 
3 The M.D. Brief incorrectly alleges that Malone v. 
Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 136 (Utah 1992) and Carter v. 
Milford Vallev Memorial HOSP., 996 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 
App. 2000) have disposed of the issue. However, in 
Malone, the Court addressed the necessity of filing an 
action within 60 days following the service of the Notice. 
The Court did not consider the necessity of a 
prelitigation panel review or the mailing of a Request, 
under a prior version of the statute, because it held that 
the issue was precluded by collateral estoppel. In 
Carter, the Court considered the interpretation of the 
term "health care provider" in the Act and did not address 
the mailing of the Request. Since the Notice and Request 
were both filed in the instant case, the referenced cases 
discussing filing actually support the position of the 
Appellants. 
6 
the duties of the Division found in Section 78-14-
12(1)(c): 
(1) (a) The division shall provide a hearing panel 
in alleged medical liability cases against health 
care providers as defined in Section 78-14-3, except 
dentists. 
(b) (i) The division shall establish procedures for 
prelitigation consideration of medical liability 
claims for damages arising out of the provision of or 
alleged failure to provide health care. 
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to 
administer the process and procedures related to 
prelitigation hearings and the conduct of 
prelitigation hearings in accordance with Sections 
78-14-12 through 78-14-16. 
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and 
are not subject to Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, but are compulsory as 
a condition precedent to commencing litigation. 
(d) Proceedings conducted under authority of this 
section are confidential, privileged, and immune from 
civil process. 
(Emphasis added) . Moreover, defendants acknowledge that 
Sections 78-14-12(3) (c) (i) 4 and 78-14-12(3) (b) (i) and 
4 The defendant health care providers do not dispute 
that pursuant to Utah Code Ann., section 78-14-
12(3) (c) (i) , the parties may waive the prelitigation 
requirements of the Act. 
7 
(ii) , provide circumstances where the said proceedings 
are not required at all. 
The cases cited on pages 15 and 16 of the IHC Brief 
are very helpful in guiding the proper interpretation of 
the Act. First, the statute should not be rewritten "to 
conform to an intention not expressed. " Arredondo v. Avis 
Rent A Car System, Inc., 2001 UT 29, 24 P.3d 928. 
Second, "The primary role of statutory interpretation is 
to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light 
of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Beaver 
County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 916 P.2d 344, 358 (Utah 
1996). Third, the "statute should be construed as a 
5 The defendant health care providers do not dispute 
that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. , section 78-14-12 (3) (b) (i) 
and (ii) , the prelitigation requirements of the Act are 
eliminated if the Division fails to complete the procedure 
within 180 days "after the filing" of a Request. Contrary 
to the implication of the IHC Brief, there is no 
requirement stated within section 78-14-12 (3) (b) that any 
post-filing procedure otherwise be measured for 
completeness. Instead, all such post-filing requirements 
are automatically deemed satisfied. Therefore, filing 
only can be considered a jurisdictional issue in the 
interpretation of the Act. The M.D. Brief actually 
acknowledges this conclusion on pages 11 and 12, 
substituting the mailing requirement for its own condition 
that the Division somehow "accept" the Request. 
8 
comprehensive whole." id. Finally, "Statutory enactments 
are to be construed as to render all parts thereof 
relevant and meaningful." Platts v. Parents Helping 
Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997). What happens 
after the Request is filed with the Division is not 
jurisdictional, but is a mere matter of post-filing 
procedure which the legislature did not intend to make 
jurisdictional. At the very least, the legislative 
intent dictates that such post-filing procedures be 
resolved by the Division or the courts consistent with 
its expressed intent "to provide other procedural changes 
to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims," 
and not be construed as an additional statutory barrier 
to the commencement of an action against a health care 
provider.6 See Utah Code Ann., Section 78-14-2 and Utah 
6 if the legislature had intended that all procedural 
items be jurisdictional prerequisites, they would not have 
included the language in Section 78-14-12 (3) (b) (ii), "the 
claimant is considered to have complied with all 
conditions precedent required under this section prior to 
the commencement of litigation." What the statute does not 
say may be equally important in its interpretation. In 
contrast to the governmental immunity statutes cited by 
the Appellees, the Act (including Section 78-14-
12 (3) (b) (ii) ) does not include (1) a limitation stating 
"the claimant is considered to have complied with all 
9 
Administrative Rules, R156-78A-4(1) (rules to be 
"liberally construed to secure the iust, speedy and 
economical determination of all issues presented to the 
division"); see also Beaver County, supra. Utah Code 
Ann. , Section 78-14-12(1) makes it the responsibility of 
the Division to promulgate rules to achieve the purposes 
stated. In addition to having jurisdiction over the 
matter as filed, the courts have jurisdiction to find 
that either the appropriate rules or procedures are not 
in place or that the Division did not otherwise act as it 
should. 
Appellees cite no authority contrary to Utah Code 
Ann. , Section 78-3-4 for the proposition that the 
Division at any time has exclusive jurisdiction over any 
conditions precedent required under this section prior to 
the commencement of litigation, provided that the 
complaint was not filed prior to the 180 days available to 
the Division to complete the prelitigation panel review"; 
(2) a limitation stating "no action shall be commenced 
until the jurisdiction of the Division has expired"; or 
(3) a limitation on the jurisdiction of the courts stating 
"the district courts shall not have jurisdiction" or "no 
complaint shall be filed" until the request has been 
mailed. The only limitation on filing a complaint is 
provided by Section 78-14-8, discussed in the following 
footnote. 
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action against health care providers. The Act contains 
no provision stating that the district courts shall not 
have jurisdiction. This is particularly true after the 
Request has been filed with the Division, said filings 
constituting the only condition precedent.7 Moreover, 
this Court has expressly held to the contrary in Avila v. 
Winn, 794 P.2d 20 (Utah 1990). As with Avila, the 
present case involved a procedural irregularity: the 
Division notified plaintiffs in this case that the 
Division had lost the Request filed with the Division and 
had closed the file without any notice to plaintiffs. 
Depriving the district courts of jurisdiction in a 
wrongful death case would also violate constitutional 
provisions discussed in Appellants' Brief. To the extent 
that the M.D. Brief acknowledges on page 16 that the 
trial court was held to have equitable jurisdiction under 
the circumstances of Avila, the M.D. Brief should have 
7 Utah Code Ann. , Section 78-14-8 provides that the 
complaint must be filed at least 90 days after service of 
the Notice. Thus, service of the Notice can be identified 
as a requirement. However, no such provision exists with 
regard to the mailing of the Request; again demonstrating 
a lack of such intent on the part of the legislature. 
11 
acknowledged that the trial courts have jurisdiction when 
a Request has been filed with the Division. The IHC 
Brief also acknowledges on page 25 that Avila held that 
the district courts have concurrent jurisdiction, simply 
contesting the factual conclusion that the "exception 
necessitated by procedural errors and omissions" were not 
present in the above-captioned case. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES AN IMPORTANT 
GUIDE TO INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT. 
Although the Act need not be declared 
unconstitutional, the provisions of the Act skirt various 
constitutional issues which should be noted in the 
interpretation of the Act. The failure of the trial 
court to interpret the Act in light of the constitutional 
prohibitions lead to its finding that the Act deprived 
the trial court of jurisdiction under the circumstances 
of the case.8 The prohibitions are discussed on the 
8 For a complete discussion of the numerous places in 
briefs and the transcript of oral argument wherein 
appellants raised the following constitutional issues 
before the trial court, see Appellants' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition, 
dated April 26, 2002, attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and 
by this reference incorporated herein. As discussed 
therein and herein, the issues raised with regard to 
12 
Brief of Appellant. Appellees do not dispute the 
constitutional requirements that exist. The following 
discussion is in response to erroneous analysis provided 
by the IHC Brief and the M.D. Brief with regard thereto. 
The prerequisites of the Act are not synonymous with 
the prerequisites of any governmental immunity act. 
Fundamentally, governmental immunity acts create 
jurisdiction, rather than limiting jurisdiction.9 Because 
constitutionality are issues of first impression before 
this Court. Thus, no specific Utah authority is available 
for citation to the exact circumstances to this case. The 
nearest cases applying the Act were cited to the trial 
court. Moreover, because the appellant has never sought a 
declaration that the Act is unconstitutional, the 
reference to constitutional principles for purposes of 
aiding statutory interpretation was adequately presented 
to the trial court and preserved for appeal by the record 
referenced. Although the trial court did not appear to 
believe that the applicable constitutional provisions 
aided in the interpretation of the Act, the trial court 
was aware that the issues were raise, the trial court 
adequately understood the constitutional issues and the 
trial court issued its decision on the basis of its 
consideration of the constitutional principles. See 
LeBaron & Associates, Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises, Inc., 823 
P.2d 479 (Utah App. 1991), cited by the IHC Brief. 
9 The M.D. Brief makes various references to the 
governmental immunity act in support of its contentions, 
including incorrectly asserting that governmental immunity 
is a statutory creation. Had the M.D. Brief more closely 
examined the cases cited therein, it would have noted the 
13 
they do not eliminate a cause of action, constitutional 
prohibitions against limiting access to the courts and 
remedies in cases of wrongful death are applied 
differently to governmental immunity statutes. Second, 
unlike the Act, the provisions of governmental immunity 
acts have a legislative purpose of requiring strict 
compliance in order to obtain access to the courts. The 
references to governmental immunity acts cited in the IHC 
Brief express a much different legislative purpose than 
the provisions of the Act. Moreover, reading each act 
independently, the history and purpose of sovereign 
immunity is fundamentally different than that of the Act. 
In the present case, the trial court had jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann., Section 78-3-4. While the two-year 
statute of limitations is a constitutional limitation on 
discussion of absolute immunity to state government at 
common law pursuant to the principle of "sovereign 
immunity" appearing in footnote 16 of Lvon v. Burton, 2000 
UT 55, 5 P.3d 616, 634, cited by the M.D. Brief. 
Appellants should have also noted the very different 
language of such governmental immunity acts, with regard 
to notice requirements that are intended as prerequisites 
to filing actions with the courts. 
14 
actions brought within the scope of the Act, procedural 
requirements that would allow the Division to process and 
then eliminate actions in the manner demonstrated in the 
present case, without equitable jurisdiction on the part 
of the courts, would be unconstitutional. 
The M.D. Brief places great emphasis on a number of 
cases from other jurisdictions involving medical review 
panels. The M.D. Brief repeatedly cites to Keyes v. 
Humana Hoso. Alaska, Inc.. 750 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1988), 
which also references a number of cases and similar 
statutes from other jurisdictions. The Keyes court 
stated that there was no independent right of access to 
the courts in Alaska. Id. at 359. The cases also do not 
involve a wrongful death action. Since the right of 
access to the courts and remedies in wrongful death cases 
10 Cases cited by Appellees, such as Gessner v. 
Phillips County Commissioners. 11 P.3d 1131 (Kan. 2000) 
(involving the governmental immunity act, including the 
uno action shall be commenced" language) and Kittredae v. 
Shaddy, 2001 UT 7, 20 P. 3d 285 (seeking application of the 
savings statute, Utah Code Ann. , section 78-12-40) can 
further be distinguished to the extent that they involve 
the applicable statute of limitations, rather than any 
procedural mailing requirement. 
15 
are constitutionally protected in the state of Utah, the 
analysis from Keves, and the other states that do not 
afford these constitutional protections, is highly 
suspect as to whether it can be applied at all. 
The M.D. Brief makes no effort to either (1) compare 
the application of constitutional principles in other 
states to Utah law, or (2) compare the wording of 
statutes in other states to the Act.11 All that can be 
concluded from the M.D. Brief is that other states have 
similar statutes. The defect of Appellee's arguments, in 
virtually every instances, lies in the logic that (1) if 
11 As discussed in Gessner, supra, the governmental 
immunity acting requires only that a claim be filed with 
the applicable government entity. The statute then 
specifically provides that "Once notice of the claim is 
filed, no action shall be commenced until after the 
claimant has received notice from the municipality that it 
has denied the claim" and uno person may initiate an 
action against a municipality unless the claim has been 
denied in whole or in part." Thus, the governmental 
immunity act (1) contains notice requirements, (2) does 
not give the municipality an unfettered right to reject 
notices, and (3) requires only filing and lacks otherwise 
unreasonable hurdles to secure jurisdiction to later file 
a claim. The Act, likewise, is devoid of such 
constitutional problems as drafted by the legislature. 
The problems exist only as the Act has been misconstrued 
by the Appellees and the trial court. 
16 
a limitation arising from one element of one statute is 
constitutionally permissible (i.e., a statute of 
limitation or a notice requirement to a government 
entity) , then (2) the requirement that the Request be 
mailed to health care providers (not merely filed with 
the Division) in the present case must also be 
constitutionally permissible and, therefore, intended as 
a limitation on access to the courts. Appellees 
conclusion that uanything goes" is simply wrong. 
Appellees conclusion that the sole purpose of every 
provision of the Act is to limit the filing of actions 
ignores the drafting of the statute and the importance of 
applying constitutional principles. 
In Lvon v. Burton, 2000 UT 55, 5 P. 3d 616, the Court 
expressly reasoned that if an award exceeded a $250,000 
cap on damages, then the substitute remedy provided by 
such a statute would not be equal to the remedy 
abrogated. id. at 631. Although the limitation was 
upheld on other grounds, the Court found that the purpose 
of saving money for governmental bodies was inadequate 
justification for the cap on damages. Id. at 632. If 
17 
saving money for government bodies is an inadequate 
legislative purpose for limiting judicial remedies, then 
saving money is an inadequate purpose for a special 
interest group such as medical care providers and 
insurance companies. In Lyon, the Court held that a 
$250,000 cap on damages against a state employee was 
constitutional in large part because government employees 
are not likely to have personal resources to cover 
judgments in excess of that amount. Such an argument 
could not be extended to medical care providers and their 
insurance companies. 
In footnote 2, on pages 13 and 14 of the M.D. Brief, 
the Appellees gratuitously raise a "straw man" separation 
of powers argument. The plaintiffs do not contend that 
the decision of a prelitigation panel would usurp the 
role of the Courts, since the decision is non-binding. 
Of course, no such decision is at issue on this appeal. 
The M.D. Brief argues that the Act does not 
extinguish or abrogate a tort or common law right, making 
Berry bv and through Berrv v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 
670 (Utah 1985) and in Buraandv v. State Deot. of Human 
18 
Servs. , 1999 UT App. 208, 983 P.2d 58612 inapplicable. 
While the Act did not intend to extinguish the 
plaintiff's rights, unless it did so by application of 
the statute of limitations, the interpretation supplied 
by the trial court—that the notice requirement (mailing, 
not filing) was intended as a limitation on actions-
would involve the extinguishment of common law and 
constitutional rights which would be subject to 
constitutional scrutiny. Moreover, the Division, under 
the Appellee's arguments would have the right to reject 
filed notices, and by their administrative acts 
extinguish plaintiff's rights. Thus, if the 
interpretation of the statute advanced by Appellees and 
the trial court is followed, there is an abrogation of a 
right by the Division in an unconstitutional fashion, as 
discussed in Argument III of the Brief of the Appellant. 
Interestingly, the M.D. Brief appears to concede that the 
12 Buraandv involved an appellant's right to a 
hearing, which hearing was held. Thus, no abrogation 
occurred. In the present case, the plaintiffs have been 
denied their day in court. Until the decision of the 
trial court is reversed, an abrogation has occurred. 
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procedural requirements that they support "chill" the 
right of access to the courts, which Jensen v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992) declared 
unconstitutional. The prohibition against limiting 
access to the courts, or abrogating a right to purse a 
claim for wrongful death, is applicable whether the right 
abrogated is diminished in whole or in part. Berrv, 
supra, at 684. The court declared in Jensen, that when 
(as opposed to in all cases) a taxpayer is unable to pay 
a deposit required as a prerequisite to filing an action, 
the requirement violates access to the courts guaranteed 
by the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11. In the 
present case, when the Division rejects or loses a filing 
or fails to provide due process by notice to the 
plaintiff,13 the actions of the Division violate Article 
13 Interestingly, the M.D. Brief has added as part of 
their argument (on pages 11-12) that the 180 days 
commences after the Division "accepts" the filed Request. 
Thus, in the view of the M.D. Brief, the Division has the 
authority to reject a filing, has no responsibility to 
notify the plaintiff, and may by any "arbitrary and 
irrational" act deprive the plaintiff of the right to file 
a complaint with the courts. For the M.D. Brief's 
discussion of due process, contrary to such reasoning, see 
pages 21-23 of the M.D. Brief. 
20 
I, Section 11 and Article XVI, section 5. The courts are 
required to measure the actions of the Division against 
the principles of ufairness and equality" inherent in 
Article I, Section 11 Berrv, supra, at 675. Statutory 
limitations, or administrative actions that have the same 
effect, cannot be permitted where there does not exist a 
clear social evil to be eliminated. id. at 680. In the 
present case, the lack of due process afforded by the 
Division is not an appropriate means of achieving such an 
end. Restrictions which limit the ability of a party to 
effectively pursue a remedy for wrongful death are 
"beyond legislative authority." .Id. at 684. 
Finally, Appellees fail altogether to address the 
issues of substantive due process, guaranteed by the Utah 
Constitution, and Article I, section 7 and by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. A 
statute may be overbroad in its application, and violate 
the interests of substantive due process, if its effect 
is to limit rights beyond an intended legitimate purpose. 
See e.g. State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 191-192 (Utah 
1987). The application of the statute encouraged by 
21 
Appellees would deny the plaintiffs substantive due 
process that was intended by the legislature. By 
interpreting the statue to make mailing of the Request 
jurisdictional, the Appellees would eliminate the 
plaintiffs' claims without appropriate remedies designed 
to ensure that the Division and the courts act to advance 
the legislative purpose of expediting "early evaluation 
and settlement of claims." 
The Division has a responsibility to parties that 
file a Notice and/or Request. As provided by Utah Code 
Ann. , Section 78-14-12(1), the legislature intended that 
the Division be responsible to see that prelitigation 
panel review go forward. An act by a administrative body 
which is taken without notice to affected parties 
violates due process. Morris v. Public Service 
Commission, 321 P.2d 644 (Utah). The policy of Ms. 
Bancroft to close files without notice to parties, 
particularly where there is no administrative rule 
identifying her policy,14 violates both procedural and 
14 The provisions of Utah Administrative Code R156-
78A-7(1), permitting the Division to reject pleadings if 
they are not filed in accordance with the requirements of 
22 
substantive due process requirements. Absent timely 
notice of rejection, the Division must be required to 
process a Request filed by a plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the appellants 
respectfully request that this Court issue an Order 
declaring the trial court to have jurisdiction over the 
action, and directing the trial court either to proceed 
with the litigation or to order review by a prelitigation 
panel, with specific requirement that the plaintiffs be 
afforded appropriate due process remedies for the loss of 
the Request filed with the Division. 
DATED this r " day of October, 2002. 
Thor B. Roundy 
Attorney for Appellants 
the rules promulgated under the Act, do not indicated that 
a Request will be rejected without notice or that a file 
will be treated as Mead" without notice. Claimants are 
entitled to expect reasonable and timely notice from the 
Division. 
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO APPELLEES' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Trial Court No. 010905108 
Appellate Court No. 
20020204-SC 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, by and through their undersigned 
counsel, herewith submit this Memorandum in Opposition to 
Appellees' Motion for Summary Disposition. 
FACTS 
Plaintiffs/Appellants respond as follows to the 
numbered facts contained in Defendants'/Appellees' 
memorandum in support of t h e i r motion for summary 
d i s p o s i t i o n : 
1. Undisputed. 
2. Undisputed. 
3. The phrase quoted by the Defendants/Appellees is 
undisputed, but the absence of any context renders it vague* 
and meaningless. 
4. Undisputed. 
5. Undisputed that Defendants filed various motions 
seeking to dismiss Plaintiffs1 claims and that on a 
rehearing of the issues, the Trial Court did issue an order 
dismissing the claims. The basis for dismissal is in 
dispute. The order of dismissal speaks for itself and 
Defendants1 vague reference thereto is inaccurate. 
6. See response to fact no. 5, above. 
7. Undisputed. 
8 . Undisputed. 
9. Undisputed. 
1C. Undisputed. 
11 . Undisputed. 
Labelle 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
THE UTAH HEALTHCARE MALPRACTICE ACT IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
As Defendants point out, reference to due process was 
raised on pages 5 and 6 of Plaintiffs' supplemental 
memorandum in opposition to motion to dismiss, dated October 
11, 2001. In addition, references to due process appear in 
Plaintiffs1 opposition to motion to dismiss, dated October 
2, 2001, the second half of footnote 4, appearing on page 
10, discussing Avila infra, Carter, infra, Allen, infra and 
Malone, infra, and on page 11 of the same brief. Plaintiffs 
also argued extensively before the Trial Court the relevant 
constitutional issues. See the attached transcript, pages 
19-20, 23, 25, 27-31. 
Plaintiffs' entire argument was based on the issues of 
due process and the concurrent jurisdiction of the Trial 
Court with the division. Defendants1 motion for summary 
disposition fails to address the question of subject matter 
jurisdiction itself. As argued extensively by the Plaintiff 
in Trial Court, below, the jurisdiction of the division is 
merely concurrent with the District Court and not exclusive. 
See Plaintiffs1 opposition to motion to dismiss, dated 
October 2, 2001, pages 4 through 8, by this reference 
incorporated herein (including the reference to 
constitutionality of the statute appearing on page 8) . 
Defendants' various motions seeking to dismiss 
Plaintiffs' complaint focused exclusively on the single 
issue of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' responses also focused 
largely on the question of jurisdiction. As discussed 
below, the Trial Court misread the statute and misconstrued 
the legislative intent in dismissing the action. The case 
law cited in Plaintiffs' pleadings focused primarily on the 
Appellate Court's interpretation of the statute as 
specifically related to both jurisdiction and due process 
and related constitutional issues. 
Beginning on page 19, line 5, of the transcript of the 
hearing held December 19, 2001, the Trial Court brought up 
the issues that form the factual basis of the Plaintiffs1 
constitutional challenge. The Court specifically stated, 
"Well, but see, the rules of procedure really 
don't apply, do they? There are some standards 
that the legislature, right or wrong, has decided 
to give special treatment to health care 
providers. Whether you disagree with that or 
whether you don't, it's the law, and the Supreme 
Court says its constitutional, so you have got to 
jump through all of these hoops. It is like the 
notice on the governmental immunity act. There 
are certain things that you have got to do." 
On page 20, beginning on line 4, the Plaintiff responds, 
"Ckay, the next things I have to discuss-and I 
think we'll cover that, perhaps to some degree, as 
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I discuss the issues of due process-but the next 
question which has been raised is the question of 
whether this Court has jurisdiction over this 
case, or whether the Court is for some reason 
deprived of jurisdiction." 
Due process is specifically mentioned at the beginning of 
this discussion and the discussion continues to go through 
the process conducted by the Division and covers the very 
specific issues raised by the Plaintiffs' appeal. 
The Court clearly misconstrues the statute and the 
constitutional issues beginning on page 23, line 2, where it 
states, "That doesn't make sense. If the purpose of it is 
to avoid filing lawsuits then why are we allowing-then why 
does the statute allow filing lawsuits in the middle of the 
prelitigation panel process" (emphasis added) . The purpose 
of the statute is not to prevent the filing of lawsuits. In 
fact, if that is the purpose of the statute, then the 
statute is unconstitutional as it has been interpreted by 
the Trial Court. The stated purpose of the procedures 
involved in the prelitigation panel review process is to 
expedite the discussion of issues, not prevent Plaintiffs 
from going forward. This is exactly the error made by the 
Trial Court and it is the basis for Plaintiffs appeal. It 
is not the basis upon which the Defendants sought to dismiss 
the Plaintiffs' claims. It is simply an incidental issue 
that came up in the discussion that resulted in the Trial 
Courts' error. The Plaintiffs' response, beginning on page 
23, line 6 of the transcript articulates the argument being 
made by the Plaintiffs on appeal. 
The Plaintiffs, beginning on page 25, line 23, continue 
the discussion of due process. Due process is specifically 
mentioned on page 27, line 16 as the legal basis for the 
factual arguments begun two pages earlier. That discussion 
continues through page 31 of the transcript. Due process is 
specifically mentioned again on page 29, both on line 1 and 
on line 2. The paragraph beginning on line 11 and 
continuing through line 17 raises all of the constitutional 
issues that have been filed as part of the appeal. Due 
process and access to the Courts are specifically mentioned 
again on lines 21 and 22 of the transcript. Specific 
references are made to constitutionality on line 25 of page 
29. Due process is again specifically mentioned on page 30, 
line 19. 
In addition to the fact that due process, access to the 
Court and other constitutional issues were extensively 
discussed by the Court and Plaintiffs in the hearing, as 
well as being mentioned to the extent they were relevant in 
the pleadings filed before the hearing, the Appellate Court 
should note that the constitutional issues raised are a 
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matter of first impression before this Court. Everyone 
knows the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the 
United States guarantee that due process. Specific 
references to such constitutional provisions are not 
necessary to preserve the issues for appeal, because we can 
assume that we are referring to these constitutions when we 
discuss due process. Other than the cases cited in 
Plaintiffs1 pleadings, the legal authority necessary to 
decide this issue has not yet been established by the 
Appellate Courts. These are largely issues of first 
impression. Therefore, the discussion referenced above is 
clearly adequate to bring these issues of first impression 
before the Appellate Courts for adjudication. 
II. PLAINTIFFS DID FILE A REQUEST FOR PRELITIGATION PANEL 
REVIEW, SATISFYING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT. 
The Plaintiffs in fact filed a request for 
prelitigation panel review. Paragraph 2 of the Court's 
order of dismissal states, "The Court finds that a question 
of fact exists regarding whether a request for prelitigation 
panel review was *filed' with the division of occupation and 
professional licensing." The Trial Court treated the matter 
as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. See transcript, 
p. 38:19-23. Therefore, the facts must be construed in the 
light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. The basis of the 
Court's dismissal appears in paragraph 3, stating that 
Plaintiffs1 failure to mail the request to the health care 
providers constitutes a failure to comply with the statutory 
requirements that "are compulsory as a condition president 
to commencing litigation." 
The Trial Court was incorrect in its construction of 
the statute. The statute only requires that the party 
initiating a medical liability action shall file a request 
for prelitigation panel review. See Utah Code Ann., Section 
78-14-12 (2) (a) . The Appellate Courts have universally held 
that it is the filing of the petition that is compulsory. 
See Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20 (Utah 1990); Carter v. 
Milford Valley Memorial Hosp., 996 P.2d 1076 (Utah App. 
2000); Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 
(Utah 1981); Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132 (Utah 1992). 
The Defendants are attempting to stretch those cases, as the 
Trial Court did, to include requirement that the petition be 
perfect in every respect as a condition precedent to filing 
a legal action. They assert that the legislature intended 
that an imperfect petition would result in deprivation of a 
right to bring a legal action, even if it was filed. They 
also desire that this Court should find that there is not 
even any entitlement to any kind of due process, such as 
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notice of rejection by the division, in order for the 
petition to be deemed imperfect and unsatisfactory in some 
respect, thereby denying due process to the applicable 
Plaintiff. 
As Defendants point out, the statute plainly requires 
the "filing of a request for prelitigation panel review 
under this section." Utah Code Ann. Section 78-14-12(3). 
The language specifically refers to the filing. It does not 
refer to any requirement concerning mailing or other 
perfection of content of the petition. Again, the 
Defendants request that this Court to adopt the reasoning 
that the words "under this section" somehow incorporate 
reference to all of the other provisions of the statute in 
order for the "filing" to be deemed satisfactory. This is 
not the meaning of the words "under this section" or the 
meaning of the word "filing". "Filing," means delivery of a 
copy to the division of occupational licensing. Filing 
"under this section" means the same thing. Therefore, the 
only manner that is jurisdictional is the filing itself. 
The mailing is not jurisdictional, for the reasons argued by 
the Plaintiffs in the underlying case. 
If the statute were to be construed such that it made 
anything other than filing jurisdictional, this would give 
rise to further constitutional challenges. In Section B of 
Defendants' argument, the Defendants point out the rule, 
Utah Administrative Code R156-78A-7 (1), permitting the 
Division to reject pleadings if they are not filed in 
accordance with the requirements of such rules. Utah 
Administrative Code, R156-78A-9 (2) addresses the Division's 
discretion to reject a petition if it is not mailed to all 
healthcare providers named therein. Defendants' argument 
ignores the actual fact that the Division never rejected the 
Plaintiffs' petition. The Division's failure to reject the 
petition constitutes the Division's acceptance and 
affirmation that the petition was acceptable and should have 
been processed appropriately. In addition to incorrectly 
interpreting the rules that the Division should have 
followed, the Defendants in the Trial Court ignored the 
constitutional issues such as due process raised by the 
Divisions' failure to give the Plaintiffs notice to the 
extent: that there was a rejection of the petition. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs appeal raises serious constitutional issues 
that should be decided after a full hearing by this Court. 
As such, the issues raised by the Plaintiffs in the 
underlying action and presented to this Court on appeal 
should not be dismissed on summary disposition on the mere 
Labeile 10 
basis of the Defendants' inaccurate presentation of the 
facts. 
DATED this 7M^_ day of April, 2002. 
< ^ 1 
Thor B. Roundy 
Attorney for 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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1 ones, I don't send copies of everything I file in the action 
2 the other parties who haven't been served. 
3 THE COURT: But -
4 MR. ROUNDY: In this case -
5 THE COURT: Well, but see, the rules of procedure 
6 really don't apply, do they? There are some standards that 
7 legislature, right or wrong, has decided to give special 
8 treatment to health-care providers. 
9 MR. ROUNDY: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
10 THE COURT: Whether you disagree with that or whetr. 
11 you don't, it's the law, and the Supreme Court says it's 
12 constitutional, so you've got to jump through all these hoops 
13 It's like the notice on the Governmental Immunity Act. There 
14 are certain things you've got to do. 
15 MR. ROUNDY: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
16 THE COURT: And I think the statute says you shall 
17 mail notice of the request for pre-litigation panel to the 
•18 health-care providers, does it not? 
19 MR. ROUNDY: I don't think it says it specifically 
20 with respect to that item. I think it says that you will mai 
21 a copy of all the documents filed with the Division to the 
22 doctors, or that it will have a mailing certificate, or 
23 something to that effect. There are words to that effect, bu 
24 I don't think it's specific to this particular document. 
25 THE COURT: But in any event, you apparently agree 
1 that, for whatever reason, you did not mail a copy of the 
2 request for pre-litigation panel to the health-care provider: 
3 MR. ROUNDY: That's correct. 
4 Okay. The next things I have to discuss - and I 
5 think we'll cover that, perhaps to some degree, as I discuss 
6 the issues of due process — but the next question which has 
7 been raised is the question of whether this court has 
8 jurisdiction over this case, or whether the court is for som* 
9 reason deprived of jurisdiction. 
10 Now, under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-3-4, the 
11 court has original subject-matter jurisdiction in a very wict 
12 variety of cases which would include this one. There's no 
13 statute, including the Medical Malpractice Act, that says we' 
14 going to deprive the court of that jurisdiction while the 
15 Division is handling this, basically a mediation process. 
16 What the Division is doing in this instance is not 
17 adjudicating the claim at all, not making sure that the clai: 
18 has some particular merit or other. The purpose of the 
19 statute, which is stated in the statute itself, 
20 Section 78-14-2, is to try to expedite the early evaluation 
21 these claims. It's not to have the Division do anything of 
22 substance; it's just to make an opportunity, a forum, for th 
23 early evaluation of these kinds of matters. 
24 And so the court does have jurisdiction. There's 
25 nothing depriving the court of jurisdiction. There is the c. 
1 completed before you file the complaint. 
2 THE COURT: That doesn't make sense. If the purpc. 
3 of it is to avoid filing lawsuits then why are we allowing -
4 then why does the statute allow filing lawsuits in the middle 
5 of the pre-litigation panel process? 
6 MR. ROUNDY: Well, I don't know what the rationale: 
7 might be, but I think that it makes sense that we have a pre-
8 litigation process and let these doctors know of its 
9 commencement, which is the part of the statute that I'm 
10 referring to about notice of intent, because that is going tc 
11 get the ball rolling with this mediation process. That is 
12 going to expedite some kind of early evaluation of these cla: 
13 and create this forum. 
14 I don't think that the legislature believes that ti 
15 is going to resolve all of them. I don't think there's 
16 necessarily a need, although it may be preferred, and I thin) 
17 even in the Avila case the court said, well, we would prefer, 
18 but it's not a requirement that the process be completed. 
19 Now, in our case, we filed it because we were 
20 concerned about the statute of limitations. When you file a 
21 notice of intent to commence legal action, that only tolls tr 
22 statute of limitations for four months, and we needed to get 
23 our complaint filed so that we wouldn't be here today on a 
24 motion to dismiss based on a statute-of-limitations type of 
25 defense. 
1 MR. ROUNDY: Okay. 
2 THE COURT: Well, now, tell me again why I should 
3 ignore the requirement under the statute for mailing the not: 
4 of pre-litigation panel request to the health-care providers. 
5 MR. ROUNDY: Well, I think that one reason is becai 
6 under statute, 78-14-12(3) (b) , that statute says if the 
7 pre-panel review is not completed within 180 days of the date 
8 requested, that the plaintiff is deemed to have complied witr 
9 all of the requirements. 
10 And so it wouldn't be proper to go back and look at 
11 those technicalities, which are things that could be fixed, 
12 could be addressed. It's not proper to go back and look at 
13 those technicalities now because the statute expressly states 
14 that the plaintiff is deemed to have complied with all of the 
15 things. 
16 THE COURT: For purposes of filing a lawsuit which 
17 you'd already done. 
18 MR. ROUNDY: Right. But it doesn't say whether 
19 that's prospective or - how that applies, whether it applies 
20 lawsuits already filed or lawsuits filed thereafter. It simc 
21 says the plaintiff is deemed to have complied. 
22 THE COURT: All right. 
23 MR. ROUNDY: Okay. I have a little bit more, as fa 
24 as jurisdiction goes, to speak about. Another rule that I ha 
25 referred to with regard to these issues of jurisdiction and 
10 
1 received without the proper accompanying 
2 documents." 
3 Meaning she thinks that you have to file the requ€ 
4 for notice - or the request for a pre-litigation panel when 
5 file the notice of intent. 
6 "If the appropriate request and filing fee 
7 are not received within that time" - meaning in 
8 the 60 days - "the matter is considered dead and 
9 filed." 
She doesn't do anything to promote plaintiff's 
11 getting notice about a document that's missing -
12 THE COURT: Well, but -
13 MR. ROUNDY: - or something like that. 
14 THE COURT: - that's not their job. That's your 
15 isn't it? 
16 MR. ROUNDY: But it speaks to due process -
17 THE COURT: Isn't it your job on behalf of your 
18 client to read the statute and comply with the statute, 
19 particularly when it's required before you can commence an 
20 action? It's not the department's job to look at every not! 
21 and say, "Oh, the lawyer may not have done this right here. 
22 We'd better tell him what's going on." 
23 MR. ROUNDY: Yeah. I understand that under the ru. 
24 and the procedures there are things that the parties do as a 
25 matter of course in following those rules. And it's our 
1 position that, while we may not have filed the fee, we didn" 
2 have notice of it, and we never got any kind of rejection ba 
3 The only explanation we have is that the request that we 
4 submitted was lost. And what I'm pointing out is that there 
5 nothing in terms of due process to address in the Division h 
6 you deal with that. 
7 Now, the court has jurisdiction, as we've argued, 
8 the court has procedures for dealing with that. If the cour 
9 feels like something was lost, and so that the defendants we 
10 deprived of their interest that they might have in having th 
11 early, review proceedings or evaluation of these claims, the 
12 the court can remedy what they've lost by that defect in the 
13 process, and the court can say, "Let's have a pre-litigation 
14 panel review now." 
15 Or, on the other hand, if the court feels as thoug 
16 the plaintiff has done something wrong by not including a cc 
17 of a notice on some — or if the plaintiff, not having done 
18 something wrong, but has been disadvantaged by the fact than 
19 they were not aware that their request was rejected or lost, 
20 something to that effect, then the court can apply the rules 
21 that we use in the court, such as Rule 60(b), to say we have 
22 instance of inadvertence here, and we can excuse that and gc 
23 forward with appropriate remedies to address whatever the ne 
24 of the parties are in those instances. 
25 We need to have the courts involved in their role. 
1 looking at the question of due process and applying the rule: 
2 that give due process to all parties, in order for the role 
3 Division plays to be fair and to be just to everyone. 
4 Otherwise, the purpose of the statute is not satisfied. 
5 This is not a statute designed to prevent people f: 
6 filing complaints. It's purpose is only to try to get these 
7 reviewed early on in the process and evaluated so that we car 
8 make sure that people are filing meritorious claims. It's nc 
9 to try _to keep people from having a chance to file. That's 
10 more properly addressed by the statute of limitations. 
11 And on the question of constitutionality, the cour: 
12 have looked at the two-year statute of limitations for wrong: 
13 death. They've looked at the Malpractice Act and what it's 
14 doing in terms of limiting this to two years, and they've sai 
15 that's okay; that doesn't deprive anyone of their 
16 constitutional rights and due process, or access to the cour: 
17 to have a two-year statute of limitations. 
18 But I think to say "Hey, I'm sorry that, you know, 
19 someone in your family has died as a result of medical 
20 negligence, but, you know, you didn't mediate" is not a fair 
21 way of depriving someone of their right of due process and 
22 access to the courts. I think that you have to be much more 
23 careful about applying this standard of "did you mediate the 
24 right way," or something like that, before we deprive people 
25 those constitutional rights. 
1 And so what we would ask the Court to do is to 
2 exercise its jurisdiction and look at how the Division handle 
3 thisf or the specific circumstances of this case, and say, "] 
4 going to do what's just, because that is the purpose of the 
5 statute. If the defendants want to have a early evaluation 
6 these claims, I'm going to order pre-litigation panel review 
7 and make sure that happens so that we honor the intent of the 
8 statute. But I am not going to arbitrarily say I'm going to 
9 deprive these people of their right to go to court because we 
10 had a document lost, or inadvertence," or, you know, whatever 
11 it might be. 
12 I just want to look at my notes, 'cause I skipped 
13 around just a little bit, and make sure I haven't missed any 
14 other part of my argument. 
15 I guess one other thing I would refer to would be 
16 that the statute that authorizes the Division to adopt these 
17 rules, which should ensure due process, is Section 78-14-12, 
18 Subsection (1), and I think that that requires that the 
19 Division adopt rules that provide due process. I don't think 
20 it simply authorizes them to adopt any rules that they want t 
21 and I don't think it authorizes Ms. Bancroft to simply say, 
22 am just going to hold onto these files and not send out a cop 
23 of the memo about the filing fee/7 or different things like 
24 that. 
25 I think what it requires is there be rules in place 
1 so that people do get notice. For example, they could have 
2 sent me a case number. They could have sent me a copy of thj 
3 memo from March saying that we raised the filing fee. Things 
4 like that could have been done which would have provided bett 
5 due process in this case. 
6 I think that's all I've got. 
7 THE COURT: Thank you. 
8 MR. ROUNDY: Thank you, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Response? 
10 MR. WRIGHT: Very briefly, your Honor. 
11 Judge, we all know very well, as you pointed out fr 
12 the very beginning, that the legislature has determined that 
13 health-care providers I guess will be treated a little 
14 differently as far as commencement of malpractice actions, as 
15 will governmental entities with the Governmental Claims Act. 
16 Very simply, as we all know as attorneys, the rules 
17 are the rules. When you file a claim against a governmental 
18 claim or a governmental entity, you've got to do certain 
19 things. If you choose to allege a malpractice against a 
20 health-care provider, you have to do certain things. 
21 Mr. Roundy obviously knew enough and read the statute at 
22 78-14-8 to file a notice of intent. What he failed to do is 
23 turn the page and read 78-14-12(2) (a): 
24 "(a) The party initiating a medical 
25 liability action shall file a request for 
